Practical and Theoretical Guide to Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) destruction and subversion.

www.schnews.org.uk

All methods described in this guide have been thoroughly tested in practice.

Please pay close attention to training section.

WHY DESTROY CCTV CAMERAS ?

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1.1) Why destroy cctv cameras ?

Trust your instincts, but if you need intellectual justification then:

"The gaze of the cameras does not fall equally on all users of the street but on those who are stereotypical predefined as potentially deviant, or through appearance and demeanour, are singled out by operators as unrespectable. In this way youth, particularly those already socially and economically marginal, may be subject to even greater levels of authoritative intervention and official stigmatisation, and rather than contributing to social justice through the reduction

of victimisation, CCTV will merely become a tool of injustice through the amplification of differential and discriminatory policing."

"an instrument of social control and the production of discipline; the production of 'anticipatory conformity'; the certainty of rapid deployment to observed deviance and; the compilation of individualised dossiers of the monitored population."

"The unforgiving Eye: CCTV surveillance in public space" Dr Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong of the Centre for Criminology and Criminal Justice at Hull University, UK.

"What we have been able to show is that CCTV didn't reduce crime - if anything it has increased - and it didn't reduce fear of crime. If anything there was a slight increase in anxiety."

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TYPES OF CCTV CAMERA.

2.1) Dummy CCTV cameras

These should be destroyed and removed as they still induce paranoia and fear of punishment.

"Full bodied Dummy CCTV Camera including Lens and Mounting Bracket. Uses an actual Camera body so it looks like the real thing."

2.2) Hidden CCTV cameras.

They are also useful for back-up surveillance in installations where the primary CCTV equipment is of a more traditional nature, i.e. standard cameras. In this case Covert Cameras can operate

as a back-up where primary cameras are disabled by an intruder. Used mostly for temporary installations to catch repetitve criminal activity.

Discouraged by UK home office.

2.3) Wall mounted CCTV cameras.

Normally mounted just out of reach of an individual, but accessible by two people working together.

Mostly protecting private property, but often also covering public space.

2.4) Roof mounted CCTV cameras.

Normally police traffic cameras, but sometimes private or large offices or institutions.

2.5) Street post mounted CCTV cameras.

Normally local authority operated for surveillance of shopping areas or police traffic cameras.

METHODS OF ATTACK.

3.1) Plastic bag.

Plastic bag filled with glue does the trick nicely.

Cheap and almost as effective as other short term techniques. Use Industrial grade bags which are thicker. Sometimes a camera going into repair will be 'bagged' over, so visually its ambiguous. To Bag a camera theres a high chance that you can reach it with ease. If this is the case dont hesitate to smash the glass, lens and any other components. Dont bag it afterwards, people need to see the units smashed.

Gives clear indication of inoperability.

3.2) Sticker and tape.

Placing of sticker or tape over lense.

Good training activity.

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3.3) Paint gun.

Use a childs power water pistol with household paint.

Fast, fun and easy method - Highly recommended.

Easy to disable many cameras in a short period of time. a typical one hour action can easily take out 10 cameras.

Carry reserve paint in plastic containers.

Filter paint to remove lumps to avoid blocking gun.

Go for lense first and then cover the rest of the camera and surrounding area.

Clear indication of inoperability, plus draws further attention to the camera.

Camera is easily cleaned so only effective for short time only.

We used super soaker SC 400 - 2000 Edition camoflaged for urban night actions.

With a 50/50 mix of water based house paint (emulsion) and water we could hit targets easily at 4.5m above the ground.

Such a paint mixture totally obscures view through glass lense cover once applied.

Be prepared to get splattered: use disposable clothing.

No climbing required.

3.4) Laser pointer.

Fairly powerful laser pointers can be purchase for low cost (20.00GBP)

Laser pointers of <5mWatt or more can temporarily blind and may even permantently damage cctv cameras.

For garaunteed destruction a more powerful laser would be required.

But hazard of damaging eyes from misdirected pointing or reflection from the camera lense cover.

Also, very difficult to keep laser beam precisely still from any reasonable distance.

Can be attached to binoculars for better aiming.

No indication of in operability of camera.

Would not recomend this method.

3.5) Cable cutting.

Cables can be cut with either a sharp hand axe or garden pruning tools.

Make sure tools are electrically insulated to prevent shock from camera power supply.

Casual glance at dangling cables will reveal that camera is inoperable.

Requires complete costly rewiring.

Satisfying sparks emitted when cables cut.

3.6) Block drop.

Climb to the roof of the building on which the camera is mounted with some heavy weights eg concrete blocks and drop them on the cameras below.

Get correct drop position by dropping small stones first.

Camera will be totally destroyed in a shower of sparks.

Scaling tall buidlings with concrete blocks requires a certain level of fitness.

Pay careful attention to safety of others below.

This is a seriously hardcore method.

TRAINING.

Training is essential for not only fitness, but also for developing techniques and more importantly preparing for unpredictable events.

4.1) Working together.

Get to know your partner very well.

You will need to know your partners limits and abilities.

You will need to know how much you can trust each other.

4.2) Fittness.

You can never be too fit.

Vary your exercises, but best training is actually doing.

Dont go to the gym - you need to be deconditioned not conditioned.

Play on the terrain you will operate on.

Start on something easy like stickering.

4.3) Learning territory.

Know every part of the area you will operate in.

Explore by day and night.

Climb every tree, building.

Explore every alley, bush and tunnel.

Climb every wall and railing and fence.

Don't use paths or streets (only cross them at right angles).

If you have a police helicopter in your area then train aerial counter surveillance ie finding exisitng cover, flares, smoke bombs.

http://www.schnews.org.uk/diyguide/guidetoclosedcircuittelevisioncctvdestruction.htm

Tip For Climbing Fences

Many activists get arrested cutting through military fences and so get the extra charge of 'malicious mischief'. Using a ladder to climb fences is impracticable as you tend to get

intercepted and charged for approaching a base with a ladder. You can buy 'telescopic-ladders' but they are very expensive so here is the cheapo solution.

You can buy metal key-ring clips with chains for about a £1.50 from cornershops and newsagents.

You can then clip the chains to fences to allow use as foothold and handholds. If the keyring clip is less than 7mm in diameter at it's thinnest - and most of them are - you can clip onto even the thin fences that they use at places like Faslane.

Bolting a piece of flat wood to the chain means the foothold stands proud of the fence and makes it is easier and quicker for several people to use in the dark. These are pocket-sized / foot-sized so are easily concealed and only four are required to help the least fit activists easily climb an 8m fence, and are also cheap enough to be disposable in a rush. If you are very careful attaching it to the fence then you don't even set off the high-tech vibration sensors that military fences often utlise, at least until you start climbing.

Make sure the wood you use is strong enough to take your bodyweight after drilling - also - test them once you've built them.

And another tip from *Monkey Girl* - "The first person up needs to take some old carpet to throw over the barbed wire at the top - the thicker the better. This doesn't work so well with razor wire, though, (so I'm told)."

Navigation & orienteering.

There are 3 approaches to attack in an urban environment: - Fast and visible At first this seems the logical way to behave. Get there quick attack and get away.

Unfortunately though security will almost always be able to travel faster than you either by vehicle or by communications networks. Being seen will also reveal alot about\ you and your team which wil aid your capture. –

Slow and invisible Spend ages getting to and away from a target seems mad, when you could just go straight to it and destroy it then run away.

Being slow and invisible will make you uncatchable. Direct Action Orienteering is the ability start at one known location and move somehow to another location without compromising the integrity of the mission.

Most people on the planet can move from point to point with no problem; that's what roads, maps and questions are for. Moving from point to point undetected, is another entirely different set of circumstances.

Normal people when moving tend to follow "Lines of Drift": natural or man-made features which tend to channel people and animals in a certain direction. Sometimes a line of drift is necessary to facilitate ease of movement.

Examples of this are bridges, game paths through dense underbrush and super highways. As humans we lose some freedom of movement in exchange for faster or more convenient ways of going places; that's why bridges are more popular than stream crossing sites for cars and trucks. Direct action activists, however, don't follow lines of drift; or sometimes they make their own for a short period of time.

Natural Lines of Drift (LOD) usually dictate where man-made features, including their LODs, will be placed. Natural examples are rivers, valleys, ridgelines, game trails, mountains, cliffs, etc. An obstacle (something that impedes movement) is a feature which promotes the use of an LOD; be it natural or man-made.

The relationship between LODs and obstacles influences everything from how we organize to where Special Operations Forces (SOF) looks for bad guys. Direct actionists and Lines of Drift. From a activists point of view, LODs and obstacles are one way of separating them from other normal people.

There are very few people in world that can create a line of drift for their use. Consider a normal people confronting a building along their line of march. Under normal circumstance this obstacle would be bypassed through the use of a LOD: a road or trail.

Direct actionists can create an additional LOD by going straight over the building. Normal people are constrained to using LODs because of the speed and convenience they offer; as well as the vehicle type they possess. This makes the activists job easier because it cuts down on the amount of area they have to look over to find their targets.

 Direct actionists are harder to eliminate because they don¹t need, or use, natural lines of drift the way others do. If you look at any topographic map, you can see a pattern that looks similar

to the grain pattern of wood; these are Lines of Drift. Normal people follow the lines, DAs goes across those same lines; or sometimes against them. That's why they're so hard to pin down and destroy.

Many units tasked with hunting SOF units fail because they can't, or won't, leave their LODs for fear of getting lost. Probably the most convenient aspect of a line of drift (or an obstacle) is that it makes a great reference point you can find on a map.

This is where orienteering comes into play: it uses basic navigation techniques to travel against or across lines of drift to an objective. Military orienteering does the same thing only it takes advantage of the masking and camouflage effects of terrain to conceal the presence of a unit. You can rehearse and simulate everything about a mission except movement.

 You can practice orienteering but you can't rehearse moving over the ground. You have to wait until your feet are on the ground. When discussing movement, it's important think about the acronym PACE: Primary, Alternate, Contingency and Emergency plans.

The primary plan is the preferred route and navigation aids (landmarks, satellites, etc.) used to get to and from the objective. The alternate plan is the same as the primary except it uses a different route. You could use the alternate plan because new information makes it a better choice or because the timing for arrival at the target changes also.

Contingency plans are the "what if" scenarios. What if the main navigation aids fail? What if there's enemy contact along the route? What if someone gets hurt along the route?

 What if the Earth cracked open and a Big Green Monster jumped out and ate half the team? An emergency plan is a survival plan. What to do if there's too many contingencies happening all at once and the boss says "save qui peut" (sav-kee-poo: get the hell out of here!).

Now the priority is to save the team, not accomplish the mission. Establishing an Emergency Rally Point and a 'Bomb Out' direction are extremely helpful when a unit gets busted up in a firefight and they take different routes out of the area to escape.

 Every time a SOF unit doesn' t prepare an emergency plan, they wind up needing it. You' re going to wish your orienteering skills were a lot better in an emergency.

climbing skills learn to climb poles, rubber on shoes ? search shinning up

http://www.jungletraining.com/climbtree.htm

http://www.ecoecho.org/redcloud/redcloud.html

 climbing stick acrobatics urban adventuring and buildering scafolding get used to heights

you may need to scale 15 storey office blocks up the outside search scaffold protection system

 http://www.nrgscaffoldalarms.co.uk/

 It's unlikely that the enemy goes out in a dreadful weather at night. escape and evasion hide and seek practice running away using bwst cover you may have to deal with helicopter pursuit find places to hide and rest be the fastest over the terrain you cover ie dont run down a street-cars are fast than you infiltration links

 http://www.sabotage.org/handbook/

 - sabotage

http://www.euronet.nl/users/kazil/index.html

 - Urban Adventure in Rotterdam

http://www.thespoon.com/stories/urban.html

 - urban adventuring - how to sneak around

 http://www.infiltration.org

 - gonig places you are not supposed to go

http://www.billboardliberation.com/resources/manual.html

 - a comprehensive guide to the alteration of outdoor advertising

http://www.urbanadventure.org

 - info about aspects of Urban Adventure

http://cambridge.ukclimbing.com/

 - buildering cambridge

http://www.easley.net/warlord/herbs.txt

 - HOW TO BURY YOUR TREASURE

http://www.l0pht.com/~oblivion/cybertek/X0005_cache.txt.html

- CACHING TECHNIQUES

http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/afghanistan.html

 - Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/guerrilla.htmllt-

How to destroy CCTV cameras Part 2.

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Direct actions against modern totalitarianism

See how Greek Anarchists destroy CCTV cameras

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AVcWKGWPto8

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4JCtXieRNRg

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YK891-tz0BA

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ycc2ZMWoXhQ

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LTTM0r79YKA

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xcaJ8fCqs1E

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZwHqHheFEEo

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E2CNIpvbS6w

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WDdAO3crAz4

3.4) Laser pointer.

Be very careful while operating over 5 mW. Binoculars will amplify a reflection and may help you harm yourself.

When using lasers which can permanently blind a person (not to mention bloody serious lasers which can pop balloons and burn paper) never, EVER (and I mean EVER) aim through optics. Even a diffused reflection may do you incredible damage. If you must use such a device (e.g. to get a camera from great distance), aim through your own targeting camera. This can be a stolen surveillance camera.

Another thing about lasers... laser beams can be very visible in moist air, and the spot illuminated by a laser definitely is. This can draw attention to your activity.

Another thing... there exist infrared lasers. Most camera lenses have infrared filters to cut out that part of the spectrum, but against a CO_2 laser, these are helpless, and a CMOS imaging element is very sensitive to IR (CCD is a little less vulnerable to it). The beam cannot be seen. This means you won't be detected, but makes it easier to harm yourself with it. In case of IR lasers, use and prior calibration of a targeting camera is unavoidable. A hit is difficult to confirm unless your targeting camera sees infrared.

Generally about lasers... use them if you are a fan of fancy technology, have the experience to do it all reliably, or absolutely need the safety of great distance.

In case of rotary cameras, it pays to check if it's pointing towards you first. :P

++ 3.7 Electrolytic solution

For ground-level cameras which are large and bulky (e.g. stationary traffic cameras) punching/drilling a hole through the tin and spraying salty or lightly acidic water inside could be effective and cheap. Avoid messing with strong acids, take precautions against electric shock.

++ 3.8 Foamy menace

Multiple construction foams have the interesting property of being annoyingly difficult to remove. They are conveniently sprayed into things, and expand nicely to fill a volume. Sometimes, they could be handy. Be careful to keep yourself clean, it could incriminate you!

++ 3.9 Reachability

When a camera is high, a long fishing rod which has parted with its topmost segments may help install a bag over it (likely without glue) or attach a hook and line (not a fishing line, mind you!) to its cable for a firm pull. Getting them back? Not sure.

Basically, there's an infinite number of possible solutions (they range from whacking with a rock to space based lasers). There is no universal solution. Assess your risks. Don't try too much. Have great patience, and luck will favour you more.

One more point: consider if your method will alert the camera operator or not.

In most cases, you should assume that it will, and that a patrol will be dispatched. Better err on the safe side and hold up the reputation of anarchists being smart!

http://anarchistnews.org/node/19499

SI FUERA
POR *NUESTRA*
SEGURIDAD...

LAS **CÁMARAS**
ESTARÍAN EN *SUS*
DESPACHOS

How to destroy CCTV network boxes

Rioters Inc. | 13.09.2011 11:27 | August Riots | World

System failure

INGREDIENTS
(Cleaned of fingerprints)

1.5 Litre empty bottle of water, with 3/4 benzine(gasoline) and 1/4 lamp oil

Crowbar & cloths

IN A SOCIETY OF OPPRESSION AND ABUSE, THE CAMERAS JUST COME TO ADD TO THE JOB OF CONTROL AND REPRESSION. THEIR DESTRUCTION IS ONE MORE ACT OF RESISTANCE OF ALL THOSE WHO DENY THE SUBJECTION AND CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

Instructions

We break open the right door of the green, white or black box, which is near the camera pole, by putting the crowbar in positions 1 or 2.

We put the cloths at the bottom of the box, you bathe the inside and the cloth with the mixture.

We stand the bottle straight with the remaining mix in the box and we throw inside a lit piece of cloth from a metres distance.

DESTROY THE CAMERAS Ⓐ

Destroy the Cameras

https://www.indymedia.org.uk/uk/servlet/OpenMir?do=getpdf&id=484582&forIE=.pdf

CCTV and other visual surveillance

This page looks at the "privatisation" of public space through closed circuit television (CCTV) in streets and other places. It also considers questions posed by the use of webcams, phonecams and ANPR systems.

It covers -

- cctv and the privatisation of public space
- video surveillance legislation
- webcams
- phonecams
- ANPR

■**CCTV**

Use of closed circuit television cameras by government agencies (police, hospitals, schools, rail and road authorities) and private bodies (retailers, taxi operators, private security services) continues to increase.

In the UK it has been claimed that the average citizen is captured by 300 cameras each day, that there were around 1.5 million cameras in 400 communities as of 2002 (with 40,000 operated by local government, up from 100 in 1990), and that distinctions between private and public space are eroding.

In January 2004 Clive Norris suggested that the number of cameras had risen to "at least" 4,285,000, supposedly making Britain the most-watched nation in the world, with estimates that the UK accounts for one-fifth of all CCTV cameras worldwide. In 2005 the London transportation system reported that it had 6,000 cameras across its network, with 9,000 planned by 2010. Images from the cameras - few of which were digital and many apparently in poor condition - were typically kept for 14 days before being erased or taped over. As of 2005 the NSW government reported that there were 7,000 cameras in Sydney alone.

Felix Stalder, in his 2002 paper on *The Voiding of Privacy* (PDF), suggests that -

Most contemporary conceptions of privacy are based on a notion of a separation between the individual and the environment. On the one side of this boundary lies "the private", on the other lies "the public". The boundary, or gap, between the two spheres is controlled by the individual. Invasion of privacy means the intrusion of a "public" actor into the realm of the "private" without the individual's consent. This notion is clearly visible in the approach to privacy prevalent in Europe, particularly in Germany. Here, privacy is translated into "informational self-determination", that is, the right of individuals to police the boundary, to decide themselves which information they are willing to disclose under what conditions. Such a conception of privacy, far from being universal, is in fact historically specific. Its rise (and decline) is part of a particular cultural condition connected to the dominance of print media from the 16th to the 20th century. As electronic communications rise in importance, print culture, part of which is the notion of privacy, erodes.

Others, particularly in the US, have noted traditional thinking that privacy is restricted to what goes on behind closed doors or in your head. It does not embrace activity in public space or that might be observed from public space (eg from an adjacent rooftop or via an aerial photograph).

One webcam vendor crowed that

with video, there's not a whole lot of restrictions. You can do it anywhere except where someone can reasonably expect privacy ... I can basically follow you around all day, as long as I don't follow you into a public restroom or something. [Debate about photography in private and semi-private places - and pointers to judgments such as exemplary damages of US$500 million to 46 athletes filmed without their knowledge by cameras hidden in restrooms, locker rooms and showers - features in a note elsewhere on this site.]

David Banisar of EPIC responded that

just because you're walking down a public street doesn't mean that the government or any other person should have the right to follow you around wherever you go and take notes of who you see and what you do.

In the US state and federal courts have generally disagreed with that comment, particularly where surveillance was conducted by the media.

Eugene Volokh thus notes the First Amendment in commenting that

the chief protection we have against intrusive news-gathering, then, is traditional real property law: we can keep people off our property but we can't keep them off the public sidewalk, even if they're gathering embarrassing information about us.

The Canadian Privacy Commissioner had a different view, consistent with Canada's human rights and privacy regime, in criticising local government use of CCTV as a breach of the federal privacy legislation.

He commented (PDF) that

If we cannot walk or drive down the street without being systematically monitored by the cameras of the state, our lives and our society will be irretrievably altered. The psychological impact of having to live in a sense of constantly being observed must surely be enormous, indeed incalculable. We will have to adapt, and adapt we undoubtedly will. But something profoundly precious - our right to feel anonymous and private as we go about our day-to-day lives will have been lost forever.

David Brin's *The Transparent Society* (Reading: Perseus Books 1998), noted earlier in this guide, suggests that the problem with surveillance of public places is one of equity. 'They' observe us

(and can integrate that observation with databases that have significant impacts on our lives). 'We' are observed but often aren't aware of being observed, have no choice in being observed and - more importantly - aren't in a position to watch the watchers or use our knowledge about their observation.

One response has been street theatre such as World Sousveillance Day (WSD) and suggestions from cyberlibertarians such as John Gilmore that the 'watched' invade the privacy of the watchers (or merely those unlucky enough to live in the vicinity).

Another has been a range of mapping exercises by community groups, including the EU Urbaneye Project ("On the Threshold to Urban Panopticon?"), the Washington DC Observing Surveillance Project and iSee in New York. The anarchists at RTMark offer a *Guide to CCTV Destruction*, perhaps reflecting Reg Whitaker's overheated *The End of Privacy: How Total Surveillance Is Becoming A Reality* (New York: New Press 1999). Arthur Cockfield's 2001 *Who Watches the Watchers?* (PDF) highlights some regulatory issues; others are explored in the 'CCTV Issue' (Vol 2/3) of Surveillance & Society

Brin's assessment is broadly endorsed by Joshua Meyrowitz in *No Sense of Place: The Impact of Electronic Media on Social Behaviour* (Oxford: Oxford Uni Press 1986), *The Spy in the Coffee Machine: (The End of Privacy as We Know It)* (Oxford: One World 2008) by Kieron O'Hara & Nigel Shadbolt and Ross Clark's *The Road to Southend Pier* (Petersfield: Harriman House 2007). There is a more nuanced analysis of issues and responses in *The Electronic Eye: The Rise of the Surveillance Society* (Minneapolis: Uni of Minnesota Press 1994), in *Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life* (Buckingham: Open Uni Press 2001) and in *Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, Risk & Digital Discrimination* (London: Routledge 2002) by David Lyon.

There is a less philosophical analysis in *Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television & Social Control* (Aldershot: Ashgate 1998) edited by Clive Norris, Jade Moran & Gary Armstrong and in *The Maximum Surveillance Society: The Rise of CCTV* (Oxford: Berg 1999) by Clive Norris.

Background on the uptake of CCTV in the US is provided by the 2002 report on *Public & Private Applications of Video Surveillance and Biometric Technologies* (PDF) by Marcus Nieto, Kimberly Johnston-Dodds & Charlene Simmons.

For Australia a starting point is provided by the report of the Australian Institute of Criminology *Comparative Study of Establishment & Operation of Public CCTV in Australia*, the associated 2003 *Open-street CCTV in Australia* (PDF) report by Dean Wilson & Adam Sutton, their 2004 *Open-Street CCTV in Australia: The Politics of Resistance and Expansion* (PDF) and the 2005 note *An overview of the effectiveness of closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance* by Nigel Brew of the federal Parliamentary Library.

Jeffrey Rosen in *The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age* (New York: Random House 2004) comments that

CCTV cameras have a mysterious knack for justifying themselves regardless of what happens to crime. When crime goes up, the cameras get credit for detecting it, and when crime goes down, they get the credit for preventing it.

There is no consensus on the effectiveness of public CCTV as a deterrent or an effective mechanism for responding to crime, although there are strong suggestions that the technological fix is overrated and oversold. Organisations responding to the "need to be doing something" are susceptible to spending money on equipment acquisition and deployment without appropriate investment in ongoing monitoring.

In practice the value of CCTV is often forensic - as a tool for identifying what happened - rather preventive, something that is unsurprising as some images are not closely monitored ("no one is actually watching what's seen by the eye in the sky"), image quality is poor or devices are not working, and help is not readily at hand if the observer does identify an incident.

Bruce Schneier commented in 2008 that

To some, it's comforting to imagine vigilant police monitoring every camera, but the truth is very different. Most CCTV footage is never looked at until well after a crime is committed. When it is examined, it's very common for the viewers not to identify suspects. Lighting is bad and images are grainy, and criminals tend not to stare helpfully at the lens. Cameras break far too often. The best camera systems can still be thwarted by sunglasses or hats. Even when they afford quick identification — think of the 2005 London transport bombers and the 9/11 terrorists — police are often able to identify suspects without the cameras. Cameras afford a false sense of security, encouraging laziness when we need police to be vigilant.

The solution isn't for police to watch the cameras. Unlike an officer walking the street, cameras only look in particular directions at particular locations. Criminals know this, and can easily adapt by moving their crimes to someplace not watched by a camera — and there will always be such places. Additionally, while a police officer on the street can respond to a crime in progress, the same officer in front of a CCTV screen can only dispatch another officer to arrive much later. By their very nature, cameras result in underused and misallocated police resources.

Examples of the literature are the 1999 paper by Jason Ditton, Emma Short, Clive Norris et al on *The effect of closed circuit television cameras on recorded crime rates and public concern about crime in Glasgow*, a broader 2001 study of Sydney, the 2002 UK Home Office report (PDF) by Brandon Welsh & David Farrington on *Crime Prevention Effects of Closed Circuit Television: A Systematic Review*, David Flaherty's 1998 report *Video surveillance by Public Bodies,* papers in *Surveillance of Public Space: CCTV, Street Lighting and Crime Prevention* (Monsey: Criminal Justice Press 1999) edited by Kate Painter & Nick Tilley, the 2008 study *CCTV Camera Evaluation: The crime reduction effects of public CCTV cameras in the City of Philadelphia, PA installed during 2006* (PDF) by Jerry Ratcliffe & Travis Taniguchi.

■**video surveillance legislation**

Most legislation regarding video surveillance has centred on its use in the workplace and its use by government agencies or commercial operators on a covert basis within private spaces, rather than use in public spaces.

That reflects uncertainty about "reasonable expectations of privacy" and whether privacy and public space are antithetical, along with perceptions that problems can be addressed through existing privacy or other legislation.

The Australian regime (outlined here and discussed in more detail in a supplementary profile) at the federal and state levels includes the 1998 NSW *Workplace Video Surveillance Act* (WVSA) and a range of state/teritory listening or surveillance device enactments noted here.

The regime reflects reports such as the 1995 *Invisible Eyes* study by the NSW Privacy Committee and 2001 NSW Law Reform Commission *Surveillance* report. The Victorian Law Reform Commission is due to report in 2003 on public and workplace surveillance issues.

Overseas the UK House of Commons Culture, Media & Sport committee announced in December 2002 an investigation of privacy and media regulation, following criticism of paparazzi, calls for rights of publicity legislation and claims that there are no UK legislative restrictions on the provision to media or other users of of CCTV recordings made by

government agencies or private bodies surveilling 'public' areas.

The UK currently requires registration under the 1998 *Data Protection Act* of those CCTV systems that "process data"; the Act and *Human Rights Act 1998* articulate principles for consent (eg signs in carparks and retail premises) and data handling.

An overview of developments across the EU is provided in Urbaneye's 2002 *On the Threshold to Urban Panopticon: Analysing the Employment of CCTV in European Cities and Assessing its Social & Political Impacts* paper (PDF).

The *Public & Private Applications* report (PDF) by Nieto, Johnston-Dodds & Simmons noted above highlights US legislation.

▪webcams

Vigilancia vigilada

elroto@inicia.es

Theorist Jim Cross argues that

a webcam in your own home is a voluntary rendering public of what would normally be private, a throwing open of your house to an indeterminately large and anonymous public. I would suggest that this needs to be seen in a communal context: this is not a case of one person throwing their world open for public inspection but, rather, joining the ranks of people who are

making a relatively high profile appearance on the Web. How far this makes them a member of a Web 'community' hinges to a large extent on what is understood by that term. But I suspect the idea of 'sharing' is important in understanding what is going on here

As with blogs, a case of 'in the future everyone will be famous to 15 people, rather than for 15 seconds' and "surveillant narcissism"? What of webcams in public places (rather than dinky little cameras set up by the proud owners of coffee pots or to allow the community to share in the bedroom gymnastics)?

Opinions are divided, with most observers suggesting that the low resolution and lack of contextual information mean that images captured on many webcams in public places - such as those developed by Earthcam - don't breach the letter or spirit of privacy law. That may change, however, as more consumers go onto broadband and imaging technology improves.

One disturbing example is the 'abortioncam.com' dispute, involving several sites - of which the abortioncam.com is the most prominent - that have positioned high-quality webcams opposite womens' health centres and other medical facilities. The sites have featured images of visitors to those locations, in some instances along with identifying information such as vehicle license plate numbers and more specific data such as the name of an individual patient, her medical records, town and age of her child.

Breach of privacy under US law? No, the cameras cover public space and distribution of the images is protected as free speech, say some observers such as Eugene Volokh. Others suggest that the cams cannot legitimately claim a 'public interest' defence and that mere disclosure of recourse to medical help is likely breach protection under HIPAA of medical record data.

Another example, noted here, here and in Michael Clements' 2005 paper *Virtually Free from Punishment until Proven Guilty: The Internet, Web-Cameras and the Compelling Necessity Standard* (PDF) was installation of a webcam in the Maricopa (Arizona) jail jail, with visitors to the jail site initially having unrestricted views of people being booked, strip searched or visiting the bathroom.

phone and other cams

US and other law is currently grappling with voyeurcams, upskirtcams and other nasties in notes on the Adult Content industry and on Unauthorised Photography.

Uptake of digital cameras and more recently camera-equipped phones (now estimated to comprise around 25% of the 600 million or so mobile phones sold each year) has driven internet access to 'up skirt', 'down blouse' or other voyeur genres - typically surreptitious photos taken under the doors of lavatory cubicles or in a public shower or change room. The technology has allowed amateurs and professionals to take snaps of unsuspecting men, women and children, which can then be published on the net without major difficulty.

The amount of photographing and its audience is unclear. Projectvoyeur.com, claimed as a pioneering free site, supposedly attracts over 600,000 visitors a day.

Responses have varied. South Korea has moved to restrict sales of camera phones to models that beep when pictures are taken. Other jurisdictions have more effectively been banned the devices from pools, gyms, change-rooms, lavatories, schools and even beaches.

One introduction is provided in *Camera Phone Obsession* (Phoenix: Paraglyph Press 2004) by Peter Aitken.

■ANPR

Automated number plate recognition (ANPR) systems, discussed in more detail here, collect digital images of vehicle registration numbers for real time or retrospective matching with official databases.

That collection and matching can be for traffic congestion pricing and road safety purposes (eg to detect vehicles that are breaking speed limits). It may instead be used for other law enforcement purposes, with for example real time matching against 'hotlists' of stolen vehicles

and those 'of interest' regarding offences such as burglary, kidnapping, drug trafficking and terrorism.

APNR cameras are often coupled with other image capture systems, so that for example a vehicle can be tracked by video across a precinct after initial recognition or a photograph can be taken of the driver and passenger on the basis of a traveler watchlist.

http://www.caslon.com.au/privacyguide20.htm

Brick Lane by CCTV

activismo - archivo - cibercontrol - espacio-público - imágenes - micro-resistencias - post.videovigilancia - seguridad - subjetividad y control

Brick Lane by CCTV. There's more CCTV cameras on the Brick than there is rubbish bins. And we've got photos of them all.

Pincha sobre la imagen para acceder a flickr y poder **navegar por las fotos de cámaras de seguridad de Brick Lane**. Un gran trabajo de mapeo y visualización que tenemos pensado hacer también en Sevilla, continuando lo que ya hicimos en Vic o en la zona de la Alameda con el taller de UNIA Feliz 1984.

Vía Ricardo

iSee

i-SEE
"Now More Than Ever."

www.appliedautonomy.com/isee.html

iSee is a web-based application charting the locations of closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance cameras in urban environments. With iSee, users can find routes that avoid these cameras ("paths of least surveillance") allowing them to walk around their cities without fear of being "caught on tape" by unregulated security monitors.
Launch iSee_MANHATTAN >>>

References:
iSee and the Effects of Surveillance of Public Space

Journal of Surveillance and Society:
On The Outside Looking Out: An Interview With The Institute For Applied Autonomy

(Back to Top)

Maps:

Growth of Surveillance of Public Space:
Select Areas of Manhattan 1998-2002
(Download .PDF 5.2M)

Data collected by:
New York Civil Liberties Union, Surveillance Camera Project
Surveillance Camera Players
Institute for Applied Autonomy
Eyebeam Atelier Workshop Participants

http://www.appliedautonomy.com/isee.html

http://vimeo.com/6163268

Shooting Back

Shooting Back is a protest against the ubiquitous "security" camera, and an exploration of the privacy issues of _wearable cameras_ versus _surveillance cameras_. The concept is simple: a person armed with a portable (more recently, wearable) video camera enters an area in which she is monitored - against her will - by a business or other institution. She then simply films the filmers, taking footage of ceiling-mounted cameras (such as the one pictured here, at the Park Street stop on the Boston subway system), closed-circuit televisions, and employees. Surveillance _by_ private individuals often turns out to be treated quite differently from surveillance _of_ them....

Read the original ShootingBack manifesto
For several variations on the Shooting Back theme, see MaybeCam.

View a 7 minute .avi trailer of the ShootingBack documentary

WearCam concept: MaybeCam

The following are experiments that the writer has conducted and purposely taken to the extreme in order to (a) illustrate a point and (b) experience reactions and observations first hand. It is not likely that the average reader would go to these extremes but some more subtle variations of these experiments will still provide similar insight or reactions.

Maybe Camera
You cannot patent a mere "idea", but, rather, the idea must first be _reduced to practice_. Similarly, you cannot copyright an idea, it must first manifest itself as some _tangible_ form. Conceptual art, however, provides us with a means where the idea itself is the contribution.

- Take one piece 1/8 inch black or dark acrylic, cut to 3 by 4 inches.
- Obtain a bulky sweatshirt in your size.
- For **your** protection, a video record of you and your establishment _may_ be **transmitted** and **recorded** at remote locations.

  ALL CRIMINAL ACTS PROSECUTED

Lay out the lettering so as to leave room for the acrylic between the words "locations" and "ALL" ("locations" to be at the end of one line of text, and "ALL" to begin the next line of text).

- Affix the acrylic securely to the shirt.
- Wear the completed shirt into a department store or other location where
  - video surveillance is used but
  - photography is prohibited (this criterion can be determined experimentally even before the shirt is made, by entering the proposed establishment with a 35mm camera or the like, and taking pictures within said establishment in a somewhat obvious manner).

The above piece is entitled "Maybe Camera --- Who's Paranoid?". Just as the customer doesn't know what's in the mysterious ceiling dome of wine-dark opacity, and must therefore be on his best behaviour at all times, so too, the shopkeeper doesn't know what's inside the customer's shirt, and likewise must be on his best behaviour at all times.

Probably Camera
Depending on the level of paranoia, if `Maybe-Camera...' is not "understood" by your audience, then perhaps the following conceptual/performance/reflectionist piece would be:

- Obtain one miniature (12 inches in diameter or smaller) ceiling dome of wine-dark opacity , together with a camera and pan-tilt-zoom mechanism suitable for that dome.
- Affix dome to backpack, facing backwards, cutting appropriate mounting hole in backback, leaving sufficient space, and installing appropriate housing for camera and pan-tilt-zoom mechanism. Leave the camera out for the time being.
- Insert a small battery powered computer equipped with video capture hardware, and means of controlling the function of the pan-tilt-zoom controls automatically.
- Insert into the pack, means of wireless communication to/from the Internet, or to/from an Internet gateway/server.
- Prepare software to allow the function of the apparatus to be controlled remotely via a WWW page, with ability to capture and display images from the camera if the camera is present. Make this WWW page world-accessible and known to various people around the world.
- Leave the work area and have someone else do the final assembly in your absence, according to the following instructions: Roll two dice, and:
  - If the total comes to two or three, insert into the dome a small light bulb, affixed to the pan-tilt-zoom sensor but connected to it in no way, together with sufficient ballast into the pack to make up the difference in weight between the bulb and the camera, so that the wearer could not determine this difference by weight.

- o If the dice total exceeds three, insert the camera, properly mounting it and connecting it to video digitizer. Verify its operation using a Web browser of your choice.
- Wear backpack together with shirt (`Maybe Camera...'), into a record store, preferably *Tower Records*, where ceiling domes of wine-dark opacity are used. If asked if it is a camera, or what it is, indicate that you're not certain, but point out the domes upon their ceiling and indicate the similarity, so that perhaps it could be a light fixture. (Security guards at Tower records have informed the author that their ceiling domes of wine-dark opacity are "light fixtures")

The above piece is called `Probably Camera --- Who's Paranoid?'. Probably Camera and Maybe Camera can be worn together of course, since one uses the front of the body, while the other uses the back.

No Camera

Dan Graham uses video time delay together with mirrors, etc., to create a delay between cause and effect. His *video feedback* involves both senses of the word "feedback": (1) the cameras "sees" the screen which is displaying the output from the camera, and (2) the users who see themselves on the screen adjust their behaviour according to this psychological "feedback". A conceptual piece, involving time-delay, to symbolize the disjointness between cause and effect that video recording creates is now described:

- Place pinhole camera and microphone into baseball cap, and record video from an establishment where photography, filming, and the like is strictly prohibited, but where video surveillance is used, and where there are documented cases of hidden cameras having been used. While recording video, talk to members of establishment, including manager. Ask whether or not they use video surveillance, and if so, why they are videotaping you without your permission. Ask what their "ceiling domes of wine-dark opacity" are, if any are present.
- Leave this establishment, and return with the following, but without the camera:
  - o Flat-panel television screen affixed to shirt.
  - o Source of previously recorded video material.
  - o Means of switching between previously recorded material and standard broadcast television channels.
- Play the previously recorded video on the television screen, and if you are informed that photography, filming, or the like, is prohibited, indicate that there is NO CAMERA, and that what you are wearing is merely a television. Switch through the various channels, indicating that one of them (the one playing the previously recorded material) looks like it "must be a local channel --- a VERY local channel".

The piece is called `No Camera --- Who's Paranoid?'.

`My manager'

`My Manager', borrows from the Stellarc/Elsenaar tradition in performance art: not just that the author's `third eye' might be analogous to Stellarc's third hand, but, more importantly, that the body is controlled remotely. `My Manager' allows participants to, via Radio TeleTYpe (RTTY), become managers and remotely contribute to the creation of a documentary video in an environment under totalitarian surveillance (where photography, video, etc., other than by the totalitarian regime is prohibited). The artist is metaphorically a puppet on a "string" (to be precise, a puppet on a wireless data connection) who, for example, dutifully marches into the establishment in question, goes over to the stationery department, selects a pencil for purchase, and marches past the magazine rack without stopping to browse the magazines. In this example, he has been sent on an errand to purchase a pencil for a higher and unquestionable authority. When challenged by the department store's infrastructure, as to the purpose of the cameras he is wearing, the artist indicates that his manager requires him to wear the apparatus so that she can make sure that he does not stop and read magazines while he is performing errands on company time. Just as representatives in an organization absolve themselves of responsibility for their surveillance systems by blaming surveillance on managers or others higher up their official hierarchy, the artist absolves himself of responsibility for taking pictures of these representatives without their permission because it is the remote manager(s) together with the thousands of viewers on the World Wide Web who are taking the pictures. The subjects of the pictures, for example, department store managers, who had previously stated that "only criminals are afraid of video cameras", or that the use of video surveillance is beyond their control, either implicate themselves of their own accusations by showing fear in the face of a camera, or acknowledge the undesirable state of affairs that can arise from

cameras that function as an extension of a higher and unquestionable authority. If their response is one of fear and paranoia, they are handed a form, entitled RFD (Request For Deletion) which they may use to make a request to have their pictures deleted from the artist's manager's database (they are informed the images have already been transmitted to the manager and cannot be deleted by the artist). The form asks them for name, social security number, and the reason for which they'd like to have their images deleted, and requests that they sign a section certifying that the reason is not one of concealing criminal activity, such as hiding the fact that their fire exits are illegally chained shut. Through `reflectionism' the department store attendant/representative sees himself/herself in the bureaucratic "mirror" created by the artist who is a puppet on a (wireless) "string". `My Manager' forces attendants/maintainers/supporters of the video `Surveillance Superhighway', with all of its rhetoric and bureaucracy, to realize or admit that they are "puppets" for a brief instant, and confront the reality of what their blind obedience leads to.

[Firing Squad](#)
A number of individuals who may or may not be wearing cameras that may or may not be transmitting to what may or may not be a WWW site, may or may not reduce crime.

The simplest variation

First Person(al) Documentary: Crime Reduction with Personal Imaging and Personal Image

The proposed performance will involve a reflectionist critique of video surveillance, using personal imaging (described in IEEE Computer, Vol 30, No. 2) as a medium with which to hold a mirror up to society.

Personal Imaging will be used to create a personal documentary to record and transmit images of potentially dangerous situations (e.g. fire exits that are illegally chained shut, poorly lit stairways, cluttered corridors and exits, poorly marked exits, and potentially abusive or irresponsible security guards and other representatives).

This will attempt to suggest that rather than having a police state, individual citizens might take on the role of monitoring and reporting crime and dangerous situations, while leaving police with the task of acting on reported crimes without having to place the population under surveillance themselves.

Personal Imaging has created its own metaphors for the aesthetics of self-defense, such as the antenna in its most familiar form which is the automotive cellular antenna. Re-situating this familiar object in a disturbing and dis-orienting manner (as a wearable apparatus), provides an obvious and visible deterrent to the seizing or destroying of image content.

Other highly visible crime deterrents comprise a highly obtrusive (yet still wearable) camera with a red led which people readily understand is symbolic of recording equipment in its recording mode of operation.

Most notably, a flat computer screen, sewn onto a shirt, allows others to see themselves on the WWW in a virtual mirror of sorts, which makes the reflectionist philosophy literal as well as metaphoric. The virtual mirror echoes the television set suspended from the ceilings of many establishments that use video surveillance, and serves the same process of providing a visceral and constant reminder that one should not commit crime.

In the words of Daniel Shurman, personal imaging allows one to project a social identity, to play out on the world in the same way that the Internet itself is a means with which to project a public identity.

"VideoClips" will also be used to confront representatives of the surveillance superhighway with a new genre of personal electronic news gathering.

Furthermore, it is hoped that the new aesthetic will give rise to a proliferation of "maybecams" in the form of a "firing squad" backed by zero-knowledge cryptography.

ShootingBack: An Attempt at Using Personal Imaging to Define a New Genre of Film/Video

With Personal Imaging I have attempted to define a new form of interaction between humans and technology. "Wearable Computing: A First Step Toward Personal Imaging", by Steve Mann, IEEE Computer Volume 30 Number 2, http://computer.org/pubs/computer/1997/0297toc.htm

I have equipped a pair of ordinary sunglasses with miniature spatial light modulators, CCD sensor arrays, and appropriate optics, so that when I put them on, I see a computer screen. On my computer screen I see a video image of what is actually present in the real world. Rather than allow the light to simply pass through, as would be the case with ordinary sunglasses, the apparatus absorbs and quantifies incoming light, processes it computationally, and then sends the processed result on toward my eyes.

After several years of adaptation the apparatus has begun to function as a visual prosthetic of sorts - a true extension of my mind and body that allows me to record exactly what I see.

Clearly I don't need to carry a camera because I am a camera, but in ShootingBack, I do anyway. Thus the act of merely making a documentary with an ordinary camcorder (while wearing my prosthetic camera), allows one camera to see through the other, and thus allows the audience the unique first-person perspective, as though being inside my eye, while I am shooting with a camcorder.

In ShootingBack, I confront representatives of the "Surveillance Superhighway" (establishments such as department stores where video surveillance is used extensively, yet photography by customers is strictly prohibited). I begin with my camcorder held down at my side, pointing away from a representative of the SS. Then, I ask the representative "What are those mysterious ceiling domes - those dark hemispheres..." or "Is that a video camera? Why are you taking pictures of me without my permission?". After the representative tells me that I am paranoid and that only criminals are concerned about cameras, I raise the camcorder up to my eye (the vantage point of the audience, who see the face-to-face conversation followed by the eyecup of a camcorder, eventually revealing the inside of the viewfinder, upon which we now see the representative of the SS displayed).

At this point, the representative of the SS often shows great concern about my camcorder, and thus, in a 180 degree reversal, is self-incriminating.